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W-ASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
ever be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act
revised or the section amended shall be set forth at full length."
Laws 1955 does not purport to amend the earlier 1927 and 1933
acts. Laws 1955, however, does deal with the same subject matter as
Laws 1927 and Laws 1933. The question which may be raised is as
follows: Is the 1955 act: (1) valid as an act which supplements the
1927 and 1933 acts, or (2) invalid as an amendment of the 1927 and
1933 acts which fails to meet the requirements of Article 2, Section 37
of the state constitution? This is the same problem involved in
Naccarato v. Sullivan, supra, and the many cases cited therein. If the
1955 act runs afoul of Article 2, Section 37 because it is an amendatory
act, rather than a supplementary act, the effect would be to invalidate
the 1955 act and to leave the 1927 and 1933 acts unchanged. If this
were the case, the provisions of the 1927 and 1933 acts would always
have been operative, and as far as the judicial positions are concerned,
the effect would be the same as that attained by a valid amendment of
the 1955 act by the 1959 act. Consequently, it appears that whether
the 1955 act is construed to be: (1) an invalid attempt to amend the
1927 and 1933 acts, or (2) an act which supplements the 1927 and
1933 acts, the policy of the 1927 and 1933 acts is now in effect, insofar
as the two types of judicial offices are concerned.
ALEED HARSCH
LABOR LAW
Washington Minimum Wage and Hour Act. Of great interest to
Washington lawyers and their clients is the new Washington Minimum
Wage and Hour Act, Chapter 294 of Session Laws of 1959. The act
establishes a minimum wage of $1.00 an hour and requires the pay-
ment of overtime pay at one and one half times the regular rate of pay
for all work in excess of eight hours a day or forty hours a week. It is
a statute of general applicability and hence has a much broader cover-
age than previous Washington legislation on the subject, which touched
upon only specialized problems such as the employment of women
or employment on public contracts.' The importance of the law to
employers whose employment practices were already governed by the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act is diminished by a proviso that for
such employers compliance with the federal statute shall be deemed




to constitute compliance with the crucial sections of the state act.'
Such employers must, of course, be engaged in interstate commerce or
in the production of goods for interstate commerce.
While not identical, the Washington act is obviously patterned after
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, containing many provisions taken
directly from that act5 and others which are adaptations of its provi-
sions.' In one very important matter, however, the Washington act
departs from the pattern of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Whereas
the federal act requires the payment of overtime at time and one half
the regular rate of pay only for work in excess of forty hours a week,'
the Washington act requires payment of overtime at time and one half
the regular rate of pay for work in excess of eight hours a day or forty
hours a week, and entitles the employee to overtime pay computed on
whichever basis produces a greater wage.' In this respect the Washing-
ton act follows the pattern established under the federal Walsh-Healey
Public Contracts Act.9
Numerous and important exemptions from the coverage of the
Washington act have been made in the definition of employee.10 Thus
the act does not apply to most individuals employed on a farm and
3 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 12.
452 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212 (1952).
5 The following sections of the Washington Act appear to have been taken directly
from the indicated sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act:
Wash. Sess. laws 1959, c. 294: Fair Labor Standards Act:
Section 1(3) [defining
"employ"] ................................ 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (1952)
Section 3(3), (4), (5) and (6) [defining
"regular rate'] ................................ 63 STAT. 913 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1952)
Section 4 [Conferring powers on the director with respect to
inspections, records, etc.] ............ 52 STAT. 1066 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 211 (1952)
Section 6 [Conferring powers on the director to issue regulations
relating to learners,
apprentices, etc.] .......................... 52 STAT. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 214 (1952)6 The following sections of the Washington Act appear to be based in large part
upon the indicated sections of the Fair Labor Standards Act:
Wash. Sess. laws 1959, c. 294: Fair labor Standards Act:
Section 1(4) [defining
"employer"] ............................ 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1952)
Section 1 (5) (c) [Exempting bona fide executive,
administrative, and professional employees,
and outside salesmen.]....63 STAT. 917 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1) (1952)
Section 1(5) (f) [Exempting
newspaper vendors.] ................ 63 STAT. 917 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 213(d) (1952)
Section 3(2) (a) [Exempting certain
canning operations.] ........ 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 207(b) (3) (1952)
763 STAT. 912 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1952).8 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 3(1).
949 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45; Part 201.103, General Regulations,
Division of Public Contracts, Department of Labor, 41 C.F.R. 201.103.
10 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c 294, § 1(5).
1959]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
engaged in agricultural activities.1 Likewise exempt are employees
engaged in preparing or delivering agricultural commodities to storage
or to market.12 The specific exemption of individuals employed by the
United States is of significance with respect to the yet unanswered
question of the applicability of the act to state, county, and municipal
employees. 3 Another specific exemption of individuals employed in
a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity or in
the capacity of outside salesman is one taken from the federal Fair
Labor Standards Act." Other specific exemptions cover domestic
service in private homes, gratuitous services to charities, the employ-
ment of newspaper carriers and vendors, employment by certain car-
riers regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission, forest pro-
tection and fire prevention activities, and employment by funeral
directors or operators of emergency ambulance services."5
Authority to issue regulations is given to the Director of Labor and
Industries by two sections, which contain somewhat overlapping dele-
gations of power. One of these has its source in a comparable provision
in the federal Fair Labor Standards Act." The other, which is broader
in scope, authorizes the director to make and revise such administrative
regulations, including definitions of terms, as he may deem appropriate
to carry out the purposes of the act." It is this section which, as will
be discussed later, has already been declared unconstitutional.
Prior to the issuance or modification of any regulation the director
is required to call a public hearing. In this particularly ineptly drafted
section, provision is made for judicial review of the regulations thereby
11 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 1(5) (a) (i).
12 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 1(5) (a) (ii).
Is Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 1 (5) (d). Likewise of significance is the fact
that the definition of "employer" in section 3(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52
STT. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1952), from which the definition of employer
in the Washington act appears to have been drawn, contains a specific exclusion of
states and political subdivisions. The intention of the draftsmen, if not of the legisla-
ture, would thus appear to have been to extend the coverage of the act to state, county,
and municipal employees. A recent opinion of the Attorney General holds the act
applicable to county employees. 59-60 Ops. Ar'y GEN. 41 (1959).
"4As mentioned above, Section 1(5) (c) of the Washington act appears to have
been taken from Section 13(a) (1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1067
(1938), 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1) (1952).
15 Sections 1(5) (b), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i).
16 Section 6 of the Washington act was taken from Section 14 of the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1067 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 214 (1952).
"7 Wash. Sess. Laws, 1959, c. 294, § 5. A comparable delegation to that made by a
portion of Section 5 of the Washington act for regulations relating to permitted
charges for board, lodging, apparel, or other facilities or services customarily fur-
nished by employers to employees may be found in Section 3(m) of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 52 STAT. 1061 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (1952).
[Vor-$4
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formulated.18 The provision made would be more appropriate for
review of a decision made by an agency exercising quasi-judicial powers
in a contested case and is certainly inappropriate for review of rule-
making activity conducted under a delegation of legislative authority.
Although there is no requirement that a record be compiled in the
hearings held by the director prior to issuance of regulations, the review
provision renders the "findings" of the director conclusive upon the
court if supported by substantial evidence, thus suggesting some sort
of record review of a proceeding in which findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law are made. In short, the same legislature which adopted
the Administrative Procedures Act discussed in this issue has also
provided a demonstration of the necessity that subsequent legislation
establishing administrative procedures adopt by reference the govern-
ing provisions of that act.1"
Enforcement of the act will be obtained both through criminal
penalties and civil remedies. Violations of the provisions of the act
or regulations issued pursuant thereto are gross misdemeanors. 0 Any
employer who pays an employee less than the required wages is liable
to that employee for the deficiency and for such reasonable attorney's
fees as the court shall allow. Or, the employee may assign his claim
to the director who is empowered to bring an action to collect the
claim.21 Enforcement action is facilitated by the requirement that
employers maintain and make available for inspection records for each
employee of the hours worked, the rates of pay applicable, and the
total wages paid upon penalty of conviction of a gross misdemeanor
for failure to do so.22
As mentioned above, the act contains a proviso that for employers
subject to the federal Fair Labor Standards Act compliance with the
terms of that act shall be deemed to constitute compliance with the
state act.23 In this deceptively simple formula lurk extremely difficult
18 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 8.
19It appears unlikely that the legislature made a considered determination that the
Administrative Procedures Act should not be applicable to proceedings under the
Minimum Wage and Hour Law. On the other hand, enactment of the Administrative
Procedures Act does show a considered determination that all administrative proceed-
ings should be governed by that Act. This drafting oversight, by the same session of
the legislature which enacted the Administrative Procedures Act and presumably still
approved of its provisions, demonstrates the necessity, if that act is to have its desired
effect, of requiring a clear showing of a legislative intent to exempt subsequent legisla-
tion from the coverage of the Administrative Procedures Act. Cf. Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
20 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 10(1).
21Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 9(1), (2).
22 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, §§ 7, 10(1).
23 Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 294, § 12.
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questions. For example, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act con-
tains a number of exemptions from the minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions of that act.2" Does qualification for such exemptions
constitute compliance with that act? If not, does compliance with the
child labor provisions of the federal act25 constitute compliance for
the purposes of the state act?
The answer to these questions would seem to depend upon what
purpose the proviso was designed to serve. If its purpose was to main-
tain the competitive position of Washington employers in interstate
%commerce with respect to employers in other states, exemption from
the Fair Labor Standards Act should suffice as compliance with the
Washington act. If its purpose was to relieve employers from a possible
necessity of maintaining two sets of records and making determina-
tions of what is the regular rate of pay and computing overtime pay
in two ways to ensure compliance with both statutes, exemption from
the wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act should not constitute compliance with the comparable provision
of the state act, nor should compliance with the child labor provisions
of the federal act, which have no parallel in the state act, constitute
compliance for the purpose of the state act.
Since compliance is deemed to exist for only certain sections of the
state act relating to overtime pay and record keeping, it would seem
that the purpose of the proviso was to avoid overlapping or duplicate
regulation. Accordingly, the compliance required should be compli-
ance with (and not exemption from) the comparable provisions of the
federal act. Such a reading comes closest to obtaining what would
seem to be a basic and general legislative purpose of obtaining overtime
pay for all work in excess of eight hours a day or forty hours a week.
It is also in accord with the construction usually given a proviso. The
possibility that some employer exempt from the overtime provisions
of the federal act may thereby be required to pay overtime rates under
the state act causes no conflict with the paramount federal law because
of the provision in the federal act preserving the effectiveness of state
laws establishing higher labor standards than those required by the
federal act." This construction also is to be favored, in accordance
with the usual standards of statutory construction, because it mini-
2452 STAT. 1067 (1938), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1952).
2552 STAT. 1067 (1938), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 212 (1952).
2052 STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 218 (1952).
[Vor- 34
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mizes the doubts of the constitutional validity of the statute as one
denying equal protection of the laws2
As mentioned above, certain portions of the act have been declared
unconstitutional by the superior court of Thurston County,28 and as
this article goes to press the case is pending upon appeal in the supreme
court. One of the provisions of the act declared unconstitutional by
the superior court was the section requiring the payment for work in
excess of eight hours a day or forty hours a week at one and one half
times the regular rate of pay. The basis for this ruling apparently was
the lack of a demonstrated relationship between the health and welfare
of employees, or any other legitimate objective of the state's police
power, and the requirement of overtime pay computed on whichever
basis is more favorable to the employee concerned. Likewise struck
down was the broad delegation of power to the director to issue regu-
lations to carry out the purposes of the act and to prevent circumven-
tion or evasion thereof. The minimum wage requirement of $1.00 an
hour was preserved, however.
This legislative survey presents neither the space nor the proper
occasion for detailed analysis of the constitutional problem presented.
It is clear, however, that the argument to sustain the constitutionalities
of the act is much weakened by the failure of the draftsmen to include
in the act a statement of legislative findings or a declaration of legisla-
tive policy. While the provision authorizing computation of overtime
pay on either a daily or weekly basis, whichever is more favorable to
the employee, does smack of political origin it is not inconceivable that
it is also based upon legitimate objectives of legislative concern under
the police power. No constitutional argument would seem to require
a legislative determination that either work in excess of eight hours a
day or forty hours a week was undesirable in the present state of our
society for the employee and the family to whose support he con-
tributes. It may well be that both are undesirable. Nor would it seem
that any constitutional doctrine requires such rigidity and single-
mindedness on the part of the legislature in combating excessive hours
of work that it must unconditionally prohibit such employment. Con-
cern for exceptional but legitimate economic problems of employers
27 It avoids the gross disparity which might occur if an employer subject to the
federal Fair Labor Standards Act were not required to pay overtime because of an
exemption in the federal act whereas a smaller local employer, not subject to the
federal act, but engaged in the same activity, were required to do so, because of the
lack of an identical exemption in the state act28 Kaufmnann Buick Co. v. Hagin (Superior Ct., Thurston County), Seattle Post
Intelligencer, June 18, 1959, page 1, col. 3; Seattle Times, June 18, 1959, page 2, col. 1.
1959]
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and the attempt to strike a balance between the employers' (and
society's) interest in freedom to schedule unusual operations and pro-
tection of the employees' welfare may well lead to a solution in which
excessive hours of work are discouraged, but not flatly prohibited, by
a requirement for overtime pay. The discouragement is, of course,
made more effective by the alternative methods of computation.
The broad delegation of power to issue regulations made by section
5 of the act suffers even more from the lack of a statement of legisla-
tive findings or a declaration of legislative policy. Without some such
guides, the delegation of power at least comes dangerously close to
what the superior court concluded was a delegation without the requi-
site standards for guidance.29 It may be, however, that even this
provision can be salvaged on the theory that the experience accumu-
lated under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and other state
statutes provides a background sustaining a delegation which would
be invalid in uncharted fields. 0
Another, and substantial constitutional question is whether the act
is invalid as a denial to regulated employers of equal protection of the
laws. Such a question has not been directly decided with respect to
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act because of the absence of an
express equal protection clause applicable to federal legislation." Thus
some doubt is cast upon the value of cases sustaining the constitu-
tionality of the federal act as precedents for this question under the
state act. However, the validity of the classification of covered and
exempt employees under the federal act has been passed upon by the
Supreme Court in the context of a due process question, and a more
recent case informs us that, at least for some purposes, the test of due
2 9 See Trautman, Administrative Law Problems of Delegation and Implementation
in Washington, 33 WAsH. L. Ray. 33 (1958).
s0 Cf. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250-253 (1947). This argument would
appear to be strengthened by the fact that the Washington act is based in large part
upon the federal act, making the regulatory scheme established under that act particu-
larly relevant.
The regulations which the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division has issued
under the express delegations of authority made to him by the Fair Labor Standards
Act are, as might be expected, quite voluminous. They cover more than 165 pages of
the Code of Federal Regulations, 29 C.F.R. 511.1 et seq. (Cum Pocket Supp.) See
29 U.S.C.A. App. § 516.1, et seq. In addition, the Administrator has issued voluminous
interpretative statements of policy, which do not purport to have the authority of
regulations, and these statements cover more than an additional 150 pages of the Code
of Federal Regulations, 29 C.F.R. 776.0, et seq. (Cum. Pocket Supp.). See 29
U.S.C.A. App. § 776.0, et seq.
3' See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 193, n. 9
(1946).
a Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, supra, n. 31.
[Vor-34
5]WASHINGTON LEGISLATION-1959
process incorporates the concept of equal protection of the laws.3
Again, the absence of legislative findings or a statement of legislative
policy is harmful to the validity of the act. Without it, one may assume
that the same considerations which led to exemptions under the federal
act were considered controlling under the state act. But this gives no
explanation for those exemptions in the state act which are not paral-
leled in the federal act. Also left for speculation is the effect of the
proviso rendering compliance with the federal act compliance with
certain crucial provisions of the state act. As mentioned above, the
purpose may have been to relieve employers from the burdens of
duplicate record keeping and duplicate pay computations. Or, it may
have been to preserve the interstate competitive position of Washington
employers. In either event, the substantial question remains whether
such a consideration renders classification on that basis reasonable for
the purposes of the test of equal protection of the laws.
Co--LIUs J. PECK
PROCEDURE
In Personam Jurisdiction Expanded-Force and Effect of Service
of Process Outside of State. Within recent years several state legisla-
tures have enacted legislation extending the bases for jurisdiction over
nonresidents. The Washington legislature in Chapter 131 of the 1959
Session Laws has enacted a statute that is probably as comprehensive
as any to be found in the country.'
Section 1 amends RCW 4.28.180 which relates to personal service
out of state. Such service may be made upon any party. It is to be
noted that the word "party" is used, thereby presumably including
both individuals and corporations. Formerly, personal service outside
the state was only equivalent to service by publication. As a result of
the amendment, such service, if upon a citizen or resident of the state
or upon a person who has submitted to the jurisdiction of the state, is
to have the force and effect of personal service within the state.
3 Bollng v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
I Chapter 131 is patterned after 110 Iii.. AwN. STAT. 16 and 17. The Illinois statute
is commented upon 50 Nw. U. L. Rxv. 599, 31 No=n DA~m LAw. 223 and 5 DE PAUL
L. REV. 106.
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